Reply to Kant's agnosticism. Kant's argument that the categories of thought (such as unity and causality) do not apply to reality is unsuccessful, for unless the categores of reality correspond to those of the mind, no statements could be made about reality, including the very statement that Kant made. That is to say, unless the real world were intelligible, no statement about it would apply.  A preformation of the mind to reality is necessary whether one is going to say something positive about it or something negative. We cannot even think that reality is unthinkable. Now, if someone should press the argument that the agnostic need not be making any statement at all about reality but simply defining the necessary limits of what we can know, it can be shown that even this is self-defeating. To say that one cannot know any more than the limits of the phenomena or appearance is to draw an unsurpassable line for those limits. But one cannot draw such firm limits without surpassing them. It is not possible to contend that appearance ends here and reality begins there unless one can see some distance on the other side. In other words, how can one know the difference between appearance and reality unless he already knows both so as to make the comparison?

    Another self-defeating dimension is implied within Kant's admission that he knows that the noumenon is there but now what it is. Is it possible to know that something is without knowing something about what it is? Does not all knowledge imply some knowlege of characteristics? Even a strange creature one has never seen before cannot be observed to exist unless it has some recognizable characteristics such as size, color, or movement. One need not know the origin or function of something. However, one must observe something of what it is or else he could not know that it is. It is not possible to affirm that something is without simultaneously declaring something about what it is.

    Agnosticism and God

    Hume denied both the traditional use of causality and analogy as a means of knowing the theistic God. Causality is based on custom and analogy and would lead to either a finite humanlike god or to a totally different God than the God of theism. Let us examine each of these in turn.

    In repsonse to Hume, it should be noted first of all that Hume never denied the principle of causality. In fact, he admitted it would be absurd to maintain that things arise without a cause. What he did attempt to deny is that there is any philosophical way of establishing the principle of causality. If the causal principle is not a mere analytical relation of ideas but is a belief based on customary conjunction of matter-of-fact events, then there is no necessity in it and one cannot use it with philosophical justification. But we have already seen that by dividing all contentful statements into these two classes is self-defeating. Hence, it is possible that the causual principle is both contentful and necessary. In point of fact, the very denial of causal necessity implies some kind of causal necessity in the denial, for unless there is a necessary ground (or cause) for the denial, then the denial does not necessarily stand. And if there is a necessary ground or cause for the denial, then the denial is self-defeating, for in that event it is using a necessary causal connection to deny that there are necessary causal connections.

    Some have attempted to avoid the logic of the above objection by limiting necessity to the reality of logic and propositions but denying that necessity applies to realtiy. But this will not succed because in order for this statement to accomplish what it needs to do, namely, to exclude necessity from the realm of reality, it must itself be a necessary statment about reality. That is, in effect be claiming that is necessarily true about reality that no necessary statements can be made about reality. It must make a necessary statement about to the effect that necessary statements cannot be made of the real. This is clearly self-canceling, for it actually does what it claims cannot be done.

    Likewise, there is no way Hume can deny all similarity betwwen the world and God, for this would imply that the creation must be totaly dissimilar from its Creator. It would mean that effects must be entirely different from their cause. In actuality this statement too is self-destructive, for unless there were some knowledge of the cause, there would be no basis for denying all similarity with its effect. Comparison, even a negative one, implies some positive knowlege of the terms being compared. Hence, either there is no basis for the affirmation that God must be totally dissimilar or else there can be some knowledge  of God in terms of our experience, in which case God is not necessarily totally dissimilar to what we know in our experience.

    One should be cautioned here about going beyond the conclusion of these arguments. Once it has been shown that total agnosticism is self-defeating, it does not ipso facto follow that God exists or that one has knowledge of God. These arguments show only that if there is a God, one cannot maintain that he cannot be known. From this it follows only that God can be known, not that we do know anything about God. The disproof of agnosticism is not thereby the proof of realism or theism. In other words, agnosticism only destroys itself and makes it possible to build Christian theism. The positive case for Christian knowledge of God must be built later.

    Finally, in each of Kant's alleged antinomies there is a fallacy. One does not end in contradictions when one begins to speak about reality in terms of the necessary conditions of human thought. For instance, it is a mistake to view everything as needing a cause, for in this case there would be an infinity of causes and even God would need a cause. Only limited, changing, contingent things need causes. Once one arrives at an unlimited, unchanging, necessary being, there is no longer a need for a cause. The finite must be caused, but the infinite being would be uncaused. Kant's other antinomies are likewise valid.

    THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH

    Truth is what corresponds to reality. Even those who propose other views of truth assume their view corresponds to reality. Likewise, those who deny the absolute nature of truth do not believe their view is just another relative view. They claim, at least implicitly, that it is absolutely true. In short, total relativism is self-defeating. Relativism of truth cannot be affirmed as truth unless relativism is false, for it is self-defeating to affirm that it is objectively true for all that truth is not objectively true for all. Absolute truth, therefore, is literally undeniable.

    Nonetheless, there is an important distinction to keep in mind:Truth is absolute, but our grasp of it is not. Just because there is absolute truth does not mean that our understanding of it is absolute. This  fact in itself should cause the absolutist to temper his convictions with humility. As finite creatures, we grow in our understanding of truth.

    Nonetheless, it is self-defeating to claim that no truth about reality is knowable, for this very claim is offered as truth about reality. In the end, truth is undeniably real, objective, and knowable. Any view to the contrary must assume that this is true in order to state its self-defeating claims.

THE ARGUMENT FROM TOLERANCE

    Many people see relativism as necessary for promoting tolerance, nonjudgementalism, and inclusiveness. If you believe your moral position is correct and others' incorrect, you are viewed as closed-minded and intolerant, even bigoted. They usually base this premise on the well-known differences of opinion on morality between cultures and individuals. The moral relativist embraces the view that one should not judge other cultures and individuals, for to do so would be intolerant. There are at least four problems with this argument, all of which maintain that tolerance (rightly understood) and relativism are actually incompatible with each other. 

Tolerance supports objective morality, not relativism. Ironically, the call to tolerance by relativists presupposes the existence of at least on nonrelative, universal, and objecive norm: tolerance. Bioethicist Tom Beauchamp explains:

        If we interpret normative relativism as requiring tolerance of other views, the whole theory is imperiled by inconsistency.  The proposition that we ought to tolerate the views of others, or that it is right not to interfere with others, is precluded by the very strictures of the theory. Such a proposition bears all the marks of a non-relative account of moral rightness, one based on, but not redcuible to, the cross-cultural findings of anthropologists....But if this moral principle [of tolerance] is recognized as valid, it can of course be employed as an instrument for criticizing such cultural practices as the denial of human rights to minorities and such beliefs as that of racial superiority. A moral commitment to tolerance of other practices and beliefs thus leads inexorably to the abandonment of normative relativism.

    If everyone ought to be tolerant, then tolerance is an objective moral norm. Therefore, moral relatvism is false. Also, tolerance presupposes that there is something good about being tolerant, such as being able to learn from others with whom one disagrees or to impart knowledge and wisdom to others. But that presupposes objective moral values, namely, that knowledge and wisdom are good things. Moreover, tolerance presupposes that someone may be correct about his or her moral perspective. That is to say, it seems that part of the motivation for advocating tolerance is to encourage people to be open to the possibility that one may be able to gain truth and insight (including moral truth and insight) from another who may possess it. If that is the case, then objective moral truths exist that one can learn.

    Relativism is itself a closed-minded and intolerant position. After all, the relativist dogmatically asserts that there is no moral truth. To illustrate this, consider a dialogue (based loosely on a real-life exchange) between a high school teacher and her student Elizabeth. The teacher instructs her class, "Welcome, students. This is the first day of class, and so I want to lay down some ground rules. First, since no one has the truth about morality, you should be open-minded to the opinions of your fellow students."

    The teacher recognizes the raised hand of Elizabeth, who asks, "If nobody has the truth, isn't that a good reason for me not to listen to my fellow students? After all, if nobody has the truth, why should I waste my time listening to other peopole and their opinions? What's the point? Only if somebody has the truth does it make sense to be open-minded. Don't you agree?"

    "No, I don't. Are you claiming to know the truth: Isn't that a bit arrogant and dogmatic?"

    "Not at all. Rather I think it's dogmatic as well as arrogant to assert that no single person on earth knows the truth. After all, have you met every person in the world and quizzed them exhaustively? If not, how can you make such a claim? Also, I believe it is actually the opposite of arrogance to say that I will alter my opinions to fit the truth whenever and wherever I find it. And if I happen to think that I have good reason to believe I do know the truth and would like to share it with you, why would you listen to me? Why would you automatically discredit my opinion before it is even uttered? I thought we were supposed to listen to everyone's opinion?"

    "This should prove to be an interesting semester."

    Another student blurts out, "Ain't that the truth," provoking the class to laughter.

    Relativism is judgmental, exclusivist, and partisan. This may seem an odd thing to say since the relativist asserts that his viewpoint is nonjudgmental, inclusivist, and neutral when it comes to moral beliefs. But consider the following.

    First, the relativist says that if you believe in objective moral truth, you are wrong. Hence, relativism is judgmental. Second, if follows that relativism excludes your beliefs from the realm of legitimate options. Thus, relativism is exclusivist. And third, because relativism, is exclusive, all nonrelativists are automatically not members of the "correct thinking" party. So relativism is partisan.

    Tolerance makes sense only within the framework of a moral order, for it is within such a framework thta one can morally justify tolerating some things while not tolerating others. Tolerance without a moral framework, or absolute tolerance, leads to dogmatic relativism, and thus to an intolerance of any viewpoint that does not embrace relativism.

    The "tolerance" of moral relativism either condones barbarism or is self-refuting.  As I pointed out above, some moral relativists embrace tolerance because they believe that such a posture is appropriate given the diversity of moral and cultural traditions in the world today. Humanist author Xiaorong Li points out the fallacy in this reasoning.

        But the existence of moral diversity does no more to justify that we ought to respect different moral values than the existence of disease, hunger, torture, slavery do to justify that we ought to value them. Empirical claims thus are not suitable as the basis for developing moral principles such as "Never judge other cultures" or "We ought to tolerate different values."...

        What if the respected or tolerated culture disrespects and advocates violence against individuals who dissent? When a girls fights to escape female genital circumcision or foot-binding or arranged marriage, when a widow does not want to be burned to death to honor her dead husband, the relativist is obligated to "respect" the cultural or traditional customs from which the individuals are trying to escape. In doing so, the relativist is not merely disrespecting the individual but effectively endorsing the moral ground for torture, rape, and murder. On moral issues, ethical relativists can not possibly remain neutral--they are commited either to the individual or to the dominant force within the culture.

    Relativists have made explicit one central value--equal respect and tolerance of other ways of life, which they insist to be absolute and universal. Ethical relativism is thus repudiated by itself.

    CONCLUSION

    From a moral standpoint, moral relativism is a philosophical failure. The two main arugments for moral relativism--the argument from disagreement and the arguement from tolerance--are seriously flawed in numerous ways. Given the failure of moral relativism, we must conclude that objective moral norms do exist. Since they exist, morality cannot be an illusion, and if it is not an illusion, it is either a product of unguided evolution (i.e. chance) or a self-existent mind.  Thus, the objective moral norms that exist are best explained by a being we call God.