H3W's Xanga

Puzzle

Fri, 23 Mar 2007 01:15:48 GMT

Time for something different. My psychology professor gave us this problem this week...

Determine which of 3 women—Amy, Barbara or Carol—all of whom claim to be a man’s long-lost sister, is truly his sister. You may assume that he has only one missing sister. “I am your long-lost sister,” says Amy. “She’s lying—I’m your long-lost sister,” Barbara insists. “At least two of us always lie,” smirks a third woman, Carol. Which one is the man’s sister?

The Ontological Argument

Mon, 29 Jan 2007 22:31:39 GMT

It's quite easily the strangest of the famous arguments for God's existence. First proposed by Saint Anselm of Canterbury in Proslogion (1078), the ontological argument is an a priori proof of God's existence. Countless philosophers have defended, attacked, and tweaked the argument throughout the last millennium. Here it is, in its simplest form:

1: God is the greatest being conceivable.
2: In conception, an existent being is greater than a non-existent being.
3: Therefore, God exists.

I don't think this variation of the proof works, for all the skeptic must do is deny premise 1. If #2 is true (and not everyone would concede that, Kant for instance) then the atheist would say "God" is not the greatest being conceivable, since "God" does not exist. Thus, I think this argument is guilty of petitio principii, or "begging the question." In attempting to prove a being's existence, the first premise asserts a characteristic which requires existence.

When the argument is made more complex, however, it becomes much more difficult to dismiss. Consider Alvin Plantinga's modifications:

1.	God exists in the understanding but not in reality.	(Assumption for reductio)
2.	Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.	(Premise)
3.	A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived.	(Premise)
4.	A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God	(From 1 and 2)
5.	A being greater than God can be conceived.	(From 3 and 4)
6.	It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived.	(From definition of "God")
7.	Hence, it is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality.	(From 1, 5, 6)
8.	God exists in the understanding.	(Premise)
9.	Hence God exists in reality.	(From 7, 8)

Or Oppenheimer and Zaltas' version:

1.	There is (in the understanding) something than which there is no greater.	(Premise)
2.	(Hence) There is (in the understanding) a unique thing than which there is no greater.	(From 1)
3.	(Hence) There is (in the understanding) something which is the thing than which there is no greater.	(From 2, by a theorem about descriptions)
4.	(Hence) There is (in the understanding) nothing which is greater than the thing than which there is no greater.	(From 3, by another theorem about descriptions)
5.	If that thing than which there is no greater does not exist (in reality), then there is (in the understanding) something which is greater than that thing than which there is no greater.	(Premise)
6.	(Hence) That thing than which there is no greater exists (in reality).	(From 4 and 5)
7.	(Hence) God exist.	(From 6)

And finally the form proposed by C.S. Lewis:

1.	For any understandable being x, there is a world w such that x exists in w.	(Premise)
2.	For any understandable being x, and for any worlds w and v, if x exists in w, but x does not exist in v, then the greatness of x in w exceeds the greatness of x in v.	(Premise)
3.	There is an understandable being x such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world.	(Premise)
4.	(Hence) There is a being x existing in the actual world such that for no world w and being y does the greatness of y in w exceed the greatness of x in the actual world.	(From 1, 3)

These are all variations on a common theme, differing in complexity but have the same general idea. It should be noted that this is just one type of ontological argument (we'll see how things go and maybe I'll post the conceptual and modal arguments later).

I admit something about the ontological argument seems very wrong, its complete lack of persuasiveness aside. However, I cannot articulate what it is. As many brilliant philosophers throughout time have maintained its validity (in some form), I am certainly open to the possibility that it is successful in its proof of God's existence. I'm just very skeptical.

So what do you think? Does it work? If it doesn't, why not?

I Hate America

Fri, 26 Jan 2007 04:20:45 GMT

I want to get deeper into compatibilism and morality, but I found this so repugnant I had to post it.

http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/25/oppenheim.cabbies/index.html

Whatever happened to the First Amendment? Whatever happened to the Fourteenth Amendment? Whatever happened to the application of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment?

Is "could have done otherwise" really necessary?

Sat, 20 Jan 2007 04:04:44 GMT

Taken from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/:

Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any "help" from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device. (Adapted from an example by John Fischer, 1982).

Is Fischer's hypothetical situation successful in its attempt to prove the compatibility of free will and determinism? Discuss.

An Historical Exposition of "The Wall of Separation Between Church and State"

Mon, 20 Nov 2006 20:18:24 GMT

The late Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985):

Thirty-eight years ago this Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), summarized its exegesis of Establishment Clause doctrine thus:

This language from Reynolds, a case involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment rather than the Establishment Clause, quoted from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association the phrase "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should `make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation [472 U.S. 38, 92] between church and State." 8 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington ed. 1861). 1

It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

Jefferson's fellow Virginian, James Madison, with whom he was joined in the battle for the enactment of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty of 1786, did play as large a part as anyone in the drafting of the Bill of Rights. He had two advantages over Jefferson in this regard: he was present in the United States, and he was a leading Member of the First Congress. But when we turn to the record of the proceedings in the First Congress leading up to the adoption of the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, including Madison's significant contributions thereto, we see a far different picture of its purpose than the highly simplified "wall of separation between church and State."

During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification was that without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general Government [472 U.S. 38, 93] carried with it a potential for tyranny. The typical response to this argument on the part of those who favored ratification was that the general Government established by the Constitution had only delegated powers, and that these delegated powers were so limited that the Government would have no occasion to violate individual liberties. This response satisfied some, but not others, and of the 11 Colonies which ratified the Constitution by early 1789, 5 proposed one or another amendments guaranteeing individual liberty. Three - New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia - included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom. See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 659 (1891); 1 id., at 328. Rhode Island and North Carolina flatly refused to ratify the Constitution in the absence of amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights. 1 id., at 334; 4 id., at 244. Virginia and North Carolina proposed identical guarantees of religious freedom:

On June 8, 1789, James Madison rose in the House of Representatives and "reminded the House that this was the day that he had heretofore named for bringing forward amendments to the Constitution." 1 Annals of Cong. 424. Madison's subsequent remarks in urging the House to adopt his drafts of the proposed amendments were less those of a dedicated advocate of the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the enactment of measures [472 U.S. 38, 94] sought by a number of his fellow citizens which could surely do no harm and might do a great deal of good. He said, inter alia:

The language Madison proposed for what ultimately became the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment was this:

[472 U.S. 38, 95]

On the same day that Madison proposed them, the amendments which formed the basis for the Bill of Rights were referred by the House to a Committee of the Whole, and after several weeks' delay were then referred to a Select Committee consisting of Madison and 10 others. The Committee revised Madison's proposal regarding the establishment of religion to read:

The Committee's proposed revisions were debated in the House on August 15, 1789. The entire debate on the Religion Clauses is contained in two full columns of the "Annals," and does not seem particularly illuminating. See id., at 729-731. Representative Peter Sylvester of New York expressed his dislike for the revised version, because it might have a tendency "to abolish religion altogether." Representative John Vining suggested that the two parts of the sentence be transposed; Representative Elbridge Gerry thought the language should be changed to read "that no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id., at 729. Roger Sherman of Connecticut had the traditional reason for opposing provisions of a Bill of Rights - that Congress had no delegated authority to "make religious establishments" - and therefore he opposed the adoption of the amendment. Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland thought it desirable to adopt the words proposed, saying "[h]e would not contend with gentlemen about the phraseology, his object was to secure the substance in such a manner as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part of the community."

Madison then spoke, and said that "he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Id., at 730. He said that some of the state conventions had thought that Congress might rely on [472 U.S. 38, 96] the Necessary and Proper Clause to infringe the rights of conscience or to establish a national religion, and "to prevent these effects he presumed the amendment was intended, and he thought it as well expressed as the nature of the language would admit." Ibid.

Representative Benjamin Huntington then expressed the view that the Committee's language might "be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion. He understood the amendment to mean what had been expressed by the gentleman from Virginia; but others might find it convenient to put another construction upon it." Huntington, from Connecticut, was concerned that in the New England States, where state-established religions were the rule rather than the exception, the federal courts might not be able to entertain claims based upon an obligation under the bylaws of a religious organization to contribute to the support of a minister or the building of a place of worship. He hoped that "the amendment would be made in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion, but not to patronise those who professed no religion at all." Id., at 730-731.

Madison responded that the insertion of the word "national" before the word "religion" in the Committee version should satisfy the minds of those who had criticized the language. "He believed that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform. He thought that if the word `national' was introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent." Id., at 731. Representative Samuel Livermore expressed himself as dissatisfied with Madison's proposed amendment, and thought it would be better if the Committee language were altered to read that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." Ibid.

Representative Gerry spoke in opposition to the use of the word "national" because of strong feelings expressed during [472 U.S. 38, 97] the ratification debates that a federal government, not a national government, was created by the Constitution. Madison thereby withdrew his proposal but insisted that his reference to a "national religion" only referred to a national establishment and did not mean that the Government was a national one. The question was taken on Representative Livermore's motion, which passed by a vote of 31 for and 20 against. Ibid.

The following week, without any apparent debate, the House voted to alter the language of the Religion Clauses to read "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." Id., at 766. The floor debates in the Senate were secret, and therefore not reported in the Annals. The Senate on September 3, 1789, considered several different forms of the Religion Amendment, and reported this language back to the House:

The House refused to accept the Senate's changes in the Bill of Rights and asked for a conference; the version which emerged from the conference was that which ultimately found its way into the Constitution as a part of the First Amendment.

The House and the Senate both accepted this language on successive days, and the Amendment was proposed in this form.

On the basis of the record of these proceedings in the House of Representatives, James Madison was undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the [472 U.S. 38, 98] House of the Amendments which became the Bill of Rights, but it was James Madison speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty into the United States Constitution. During the ratification debate in the Virginia Convention, Madison had actually opposed the idea of any Bill of Rights. His sponsorship of the Amendments in the House was obviously not that of a zealous believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses, but of one who felt it might do some good, could do no harm, and would satisfy those who had ratified the Constitution on the condition that Congress propose a Bill of Rights. 3 His original language "nor shall any national religion be established" obviously does not conform to the "wall of separation" between church and State idea which latter-day commentators have ascribed to him. His explanation on the floor of the meaning of his language - "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law" is of the same ilk. When he replied to Huntington in the debate over the proposal which came from the Select Committee of the House, he urged that the language "no religion shall be established by law" should be amended by inserting the word "national" in front of the word "religion."

It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion. Thus the Court's opinion in Everson - while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the [472 U.S. 38, 99] Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty - is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of the United States House of Representatives when he proposed the language which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights.

The repetition of this error in the Court's opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and, inter alia, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), does not make it any sounder historically. Finally, in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963), the Court made the truly remarkable statement that "the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States" (footnote omitted). On the basis of what evidence we have, this statement is demonstrably incorrect as a matter of history. 4 And its repetition in varying forms in succeeding opinions of the Court can give it no more authority than it possesses as a matter of fact; stare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it cannot bind them as to matters of history.

None of the other Members of Congress who spoke during the August 15th debate expressed the slightest indication that they thought the language before them from the Select Committee, or the evil to be aimed at, would require that the Government be absolutely neutral as between religion and irreligion. The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke were concerned, appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid all religions evenhandedly. If one were to follow the advice of JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 236, and construe the Amendment in the light of what particular [472 U.S. 38, 100] "practices . . . challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent," one would have to say that the First Amendment Establishment Clause should be read no more broadly than to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the governmental preference of one religious sect over another.

The actions of the First Congress, which reenacted the Northwest Ordinance for the governance of the Northwest Territory in 1789, confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the Government should be neutral between religion and irreligion. The House of Representatives took up the Northwest Ordinance on the same day as Madison introduced his proposed amendments which became the Bill of Rights; while at that time the Federal Government was of course not bound by draft amendments to the Constitution which had not yet been proposed by Congress, say nothing of ratified by the States, it seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would simultaneously consider proposed amendments to the Constitution and enact an important piece of territorial legislation which conflicted with the intent of those proposals. The Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 50, reenacted the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Id., at 52, n. (a). Land grants for schools in the Northwest Territory were not limited to public schools. It was not until 1845 that Congress limited land grants in the new States and Territories to nonsectarian schools. 5 Stat. 788; C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment 163 (1964).

On the day after the House of Representatives voted to adopt the form of the First Amendment Religion Clauses which was ultimately proposed and ratified, Representative [472 U.S. 38, 101] Elias Boudinot proposed a resolution asking President George Washington to issue a Thanksgiving Day Proclamation. Boudinot said he "could not think of letting the session pass over without offering an opportunity to all the citizens of the United States of joining with one voice, in returning to Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings he had poured down upon them." 1 Annals of Cong. 914 (1789). Representative Aedanas Burke objected to the resolution because he did not like "this mimicking of European customs"; Representative Thomas Tucker objected that whether or not the people had reason to be satisfied with the Constitution was something that the States knew better than the Congress, and in any event "it is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us." Id., at 915. Representative Sherman supported the resolution "not only as a laudable one in itself, but as warranted by a number of precedents in Holy Writ: for instance, the solemn thanksgivings and rejoicings which took place in the time of Solomon, after the building of the temple, was a case in point. This example, he thought, worthy of Christian imitation on the present occasion . . . ." Ibid.

Boudinot's resolution was carried in the affirmative on September 25, 1789. Boudinot and Sherman, who favored the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted in favor of the adoption of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the Religion Clauses; Tucker, who opposed the Thanksgiving Proclamation, voted against the adoption of the amendments which became the Bill of Rights.

Within two weeks of this action by the House, George Washington responded to the Joint Resolution which by now had been changed to include the language that the President "recommend to the people of the United States a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God, especially by affording them an opportunity peaceably to establish a form of government for their safety and happiness." 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of [472 U.S. 38, 102] the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1897). The Presidential Proclamation was couched in these words:

[472 U.S. 38, 103]

George Washington, John Adams, and James Madison all issued Thanksgiving Proclamations; Thomas Jefferson did not, saying:

As the United States moved from the 18th into the 19th century, Congress appropriated time and again public moneys in support of sectarian Indian education carried on by religious organizations. Typical of these was Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, which provided annual cash support for the Tribe's Roman Catholic priest and church. 5 It was not until 1897, when aid to sectarian education [472 U.S. 38, 104] for Indians had reached $500,000 annually, that Congress decided thereafter to cease appropriating money for education in sectarian schools. See Act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, 79; cf. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 77 -79 (1908); J. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution 118-119 (1949). See generally R. Cord, Separation of Church and State 61-82 (1982). This history shows the fallacy of the notion found in Everson that "no tax in any amount" may be levied for religious activities in any form. 330 U.S., at 15 -16.

Joseph Story, a Member of this Court from 1811 to 1845, and during much of that time a professor at the Harvard Law School, published by far the most comprehensive treatise on the United States Constitution that had then appeared. Volume 2 of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 630-632 (5th ed. 1891) discussed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment this way:

[472 U.S. 38, 105]

Thomas Cooley's eminence as a legal authority rivaled that of Story. Cooley stated in his treatise entitled Constitutional Limitations that aid to a particular religious sect was prohibited by the United States Constitution, but he went on to say:

[472 U.S. 38, 106]

Cooley added that

It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or denominations. Indeed, the first American dictionary defined the word "establishment" as "the act of establishing, founding, ratifying or ordaining," such as in "[t]he episcopal form of religion, so called, in England." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1st ed. 1828). The Establishment Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the "wall of separation" that was constitutionalized in Everson.

Notwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this theory of rigid separation, the wall idea might well have served as a useful albeit misguided analytical concept, had it led this Court to unified and principled results in Establishment Clause cases. The opposite, unfortunately, has been [472 U.S. 38, 107] true; in the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided pluralities, 6 have with embarrassing candor conceded that the "wall of separation" is merely a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier," which "is not wholly accurate" and can only be "dimly perceived." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 -678, (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).

Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrates only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926).

But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of litigation," ante, at 52, is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned. [472 U.S. 38, 108]

The Court has more recently attempted to add some mortar to Everson's wall through the three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 614-615, which served at first to offer a more useful test for purposes of the Establishment Clause than did the "wall" metaphor. Generally stated, the Lemon test proscribes state action that has a sectarian purpose or effect, or causes an impermissible governmental entanglement with religion.

Lemon cited Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), as the source of the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the three-part test. The Allen opinion explains, however, how it inherited the purpose and effect elements from Schempp and Everson, both of which contain the historical errors described above. See Allen, supra, at 243. Thus the purpose and effect prongs have the same historical deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based on either the language or intent of the drafters.

The secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application because it has never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to operate. If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian institutions accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says nothing about aiding religion. Thus the constitutionality of a statute may depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative history and, more importantly, what they leave out. The purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references, because legislators might do just that. Faced with a valid legislative secular purpose, we could not properly ignore that purpose without a factual basis for doing so. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 262 -263 (1982) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

However, if the purpose prong is aimed to void all statutes enacted with the intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether stated or not, then most statutes providing any aid, such as [472 U.S. 38, 109] textbooks or bus rides for sectarian school children, will fail because one of the purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is to aid the target of its largesse. In other words, if the purpose prong requires an absence of any intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether or not expressed, few state laws in this area could pass the test, and we would be required to void some state aids to religion which we have already upheld. E. g., Allen, supra.

The entanglement prong of the Lemon test came from Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Walz involved a constitutional challenge to New York's time-honored practice of providing state property tax exemptions to church property used in worship. The Walz opinion refused to "undermine the ultimate constitutional objective [of the Establishment Clause] as illuminated by history," id., at 671, and upheld the tax exemption. The Court examined the historical relationship between the State and church when church property was in issue, and determined that the challenged tax exemption did not so entangle New York with the church as to cause an intrusion or interference with religion. Interferences with religion should arguably be dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause, but the entanglement inquiry in Walz was consistent with that case's broad survey of the relationship between state taxation and religious property.

We have not always followed Walz' reflective inquiry into entanglement, however. E. g., Wolman, supra, at 254. One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when divorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an "insoluable paradox" in school aid cases: we have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself will create an entanglement. Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 -769 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). For example, in Wolman, supra, the Court in part struck the State's nondiscriminatory provision of buses for parochial school filed trips, because the state supervision [472 U.S. 38, 110] of sectarian officials in charge of field trips would be too onerous. This type of self-defeating result is certainly not required to ensure that States do not establish religions.

The entanglement test as applied in cases like Wolman also ignores the myriad state administrative regulations properly placed upon sectarian institutions such as curriculum, attendance, and certification requirements for sectarian schools, or fire and safety regulations for churches. Avoiding entanglement between church and State may be an important consideration in a case like Walz, but if the entanglement prong were applied to all state and church relations in the automatic manner in which it has been applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly require anything of church-related institutions as a condition for receipt of financial assistance.

These difficulties arise because the Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three-part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to realize. Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to fracture into unworkable plurality opinions, see n. 6, supra, depending upon how each of the three factors applies to a certain state action. The results from our school services cases show the difficulty we have encountered in making the Lemon test yield principled results.

For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks 7 that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. 8 A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on [472 U.S. 38, 111] George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them nonreusable. 9 A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools 10 but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. 11 A State may pay for diagnostic services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a different building; speech and hearing "services" conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367 , 371 (1975), but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside the sectarian school. Wolman, 433 U.S., at 241 . Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but it must take place outside of the parochial school, 12 such as in a trailer parked down the street. Id., at 245. A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of state-written tests and state-ordered reporting services, 13 but it may not provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. 14 Religious instruction may not be given in public school, 15 but the public school may release students during the day for religion classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws. 16

These results violate the historically sound principle "that the Establishment Clause does not forbid governments . . . to [provide] general welfare under which benefits are distributed to private individuals, even though many of those individuals [472 U.S. 38, 112] may elect to use those benefits in ways that `aid' religious instruction or worship." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 799 (1973) (BURGER, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It is not surprising in the light of this record that our most recent opinions have expressed doubt on the usefulness of the Lemon test.

Although the test initially provided helpful assistance, e. g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), we soon began describing the test as only a "guideline," Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, and lately we have described it as "no more than [a] useful signpos[t]." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983), citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). We have noted that the Lemon test is "not easily applied," Meek, supra, at 358, and as JUSTICE WHITE noted in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), under the Lemon test we have "sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility." 444 U.S. at 662. In Lynch we reiterated that the Lemon test has never been binding on the Court, and we cited two cases where we had declined to apply it. 465 U.S., at 679 , citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).

If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it. The "crucible of litigation," ante, at 52, has produced only consistent unpredictability, and today's effort is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task of trying to patch together the `blurred, indistinct and variable barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman." Regan, supra, at 671 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). We have done much straining since 1947, but still we admit that we can only "dimly perceive" the Everson wall. Tilton, supra. Our perception has been clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of an unnecessary metaphor. [472 U.S. 38, 113]

The true meaning of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history. See Walz, 397 U.S., at 671 -673; see also Lynch, supra, at 673-678. As drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today. Any deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter and will only lead to the type of unprincipled decisionmaking that has plagued our Establishment Clause cases since Everson.

The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a "national" one. The Clause was also designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the "incorporation" of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from establishing a religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows, however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.

The Court strikes down the Alabama statute because the State wished to "characterize prayer as a favored practice." Ante, at 60. It would come as much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of thoughtful Americans today to learn that the Constitution, as construed by the majority, prohibits the Alabama Legislature from "endorsing" prayer. George Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of "public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favors of Almighty God." History must judge whether it was the Father of his Country in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.

The State surely has a secular interest in regulating the manner in which public schools are conducted. Nothing in [472 U.S. 38, 114] the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, properly understood, prohibits any such generalized "endorsement" of prayer. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

[ Footnote 1 ] Reynolds is the only authority cited as direct precedent for the "wall of separation theory." 330 U.S., at 16 . Reynolds is truly inapt; it dealt with a Mormon's Free Exercise Clause challenge to a federal polygamy law.

[ Footnote 2 ] The New York and Rhode Island proposals were quite similar. They stated that no particular "religious sect or society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others." 1 Elliot's Debates, at 328; id., at 334.

[ Footnote 3 ] In a letter he sent to Jefferson in France, Madison stated that he did not see much importance in a Bill of Rights but he planned to support it because it was "anxiously desired by others . . . [and] it might be of use, and if properly executed could not be of disservice." 5 Writings of James Madison 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).

[ Footnote 4 ] State establishments were prevalent throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See Mass. Const. of 1780, Part 1, Art. III; N. H. Const. of 1784, Art. VI; Md. Declaration of Rights of 1776, Art. XXXIII; R. I. Charter of 1633 (superseded 1842).

[ Footnote 5 ] The treaty stated in part:

From 1789 to 1823 the United States Congress had provided a trust endowment of up to 12,000 acres of land "for the Society of the United Brethren, for propagating the Gospel among the Heathen." See, e. g., ch. 46, 1 Stat. 490. The Act creating this endowment was renewed periodically and the renewals were signed into law by Washington, Adams, and Jefferson.

Congressional grants for the aid of religion were not limited to Indians. In 1787 Congress provided land to the Ohio Company, including acreage for the support of religion. This grant was reauthorized in 1792. See 1 Stat. 257. In 1833 Congress authorized the State of Ohio to sell the land [472 U.S. 38, 104] set aside for religion and use the proceeds "for the support of religion . . . and for no other use or purpose whatsoever. . . ." 4 Stat. 618-619.

[ Footnote 6 ] Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (partial); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).

Many of our other Establishment Clause cases have been decided by bare 5-4 majorities. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); cf. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).

[ Footnote 7 ] Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).

[ Footnote 8 ] Meek, 421 U.S., at 362 -366. A science book is permissible, a science kit is not. See Wolman, 433 U.S., at 249 .

[ Footnote 9 ] See Meek, supra, at 354-355, nn. 3, 4, 362-366.

[ Footnote 10 ] Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

[ Footnote 11 ] Wolman, supra, at 252-255.

[ Footnote 12 ] Wolman, supra, at 241-248; Meek, supra, at 352, n. 2, 367-373.

[ Footnote 13 ] Regan, 444 U.S., at 648 , 657-659.

[ Footnote 14 ] Levitt, 413 U.S., at 479 -482.

[ Footnote 15 ] Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[ Footnote 16 ] Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). [472 U.S. 38, 115]

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

Wed, 11 Oct 2006 04:27:43 GMT

I meant to post on the recently passed Military Commissions Act, but this is 1) shorter 2) more easily understood, and 3) something along the lines of what I was thinking about this week and discussing with some friends. So the MCA will wait until next time.

Karanis is a self-admittedly arrogant frequenter of ArgumentsFromTheLeft's site. In the latest debate on morality, he posted this in an attempt to prove that morality does not come from God:

Belief in God should actually cause more people to kill:

"The Spaniards in Mexico and Peru used to baptize Indian infants and then immediately dash their brains out: by this means they secured these infants went to Heaven. No orthodox Christian can find any logical reason for condemning their action, although all nowadays do so. In countless ways the doctrine of personal immortality in its Christian form has had disastrous effects upon morals..."

So observed Bertrand Russel in Why I am Not a Christian.

After all, if this physical life is only secondary to an eternal, more important higher-tier existence, then people should be finding ways to make this life end as quickly and painlessly as possible once fealty to God is established.

That a Nobel Laureate could make this argument is suprising. It's rampant with flaws:

First off, Spaniards in Mexico and Peru of hundreds of years ago are hardly role models for practicing hermeneutics. The tradition of baptizing infants, although common in some denominations, is found nowhere in biblical texts. Furthermore, based even less in solid biblical exegesis is the idea that baptism is required for salvation. The vast majority of Christians don't think that baptism is a prerequisite for eternal life, and I would say that this is fairly easily supported. Professor Russel doesn't even attempt to argue that baptism is biblically required, however, so I won't bother refuting what most already hold to erroneous.

But let us overlook these issues that bring the theodical qualifications of the Spaniards into question. Since most reputable Christians I know--including John MacArthur--believe that the souls of deceased infants go to Heaven, baptized or not, let's assume the Spaniards were simply killing the Indian babies. The argument is that since killed babies go to Heaven, and Christians are to try to get as many people in Heaven as possible, the right thing to do would actually be to kill all young children before they reach the alleged "age of accountability," a reductio ad absurdum of sorts. For clarity's sake, I will put the argument in syllogistic form:

1) Killed babies go to Heaven.
2) The goal of the Christian on Earth is to save as many people as possible.
3) Therefore, Christians should kill babies.

The Calvinist can of course dismiss the argument by pointing out that the babies, had they been allowed to grow up, would have become Christians anyway. Predestination aside, however, the argument still fails. Quite simply, premise #2 is based on a misunderstanding of the Christian faith. I would say that it is actually easy to refute, using no scripture. As "the goal of the Christian" obviously stems from the will of God, the second premise implies that God wants as many people saved as possible. This, I argue, is obviously incorrect. My argument for this is based off of two very simple statements, nearly considered axioms in the Christian faith: 1) God is all-powerful, and 2) people go to Hell. If an omnipotent being desired all people to believe something, don't you think they all would? An exegesis of passages dealing with God's supposed desire for the salvation of all would be too lengthy for these purposes, not to mention irrelevant. Suffice it to say that any serious Christian believes that God has two types of wills: decretive and sovereign, the former pertaining to written commandments and the latter to God's actual plans. At most God's desire for the salvation of all is only decretive, as it is quite clear that all will not be saved.

I liken these two conflicting desires of God to my desires to eat cheesecake and be healthy. Although part of me wants the temporary satisfaction offered by the cheesecake, another part of me wants to abstain for health purposes, and usually the second wins out. Although God may, on some level, want all people to end up in Heaven, every Christian must admit He has some deeper, apparently more important desire. This is usually explained in one of two ways: 1) God thinks damning people is the best way to show off his justice and wrath, or 2) God respects the fact that people have a choice. Since response #1 is Calvinistic by nature, and Calvinists squirmed out of this argument a long time ago, I will only deal with #2. It states that the respecting of an individual's uncoerced decision is more important than their eternal destiny, as it makes the choice of those that chose Heaven the that much greater, allegedly. And now we have contradicted the idea that God wants as many people saved as possible. He may wish all choose Him of their own volition, but He is not willing to violate that choice, even if it means many people making the wrong one. Obviously killing infants denies them the ability to choose God, and thus goes against His deepest desire, not to mention is in indisputable contradiction to his decretive will.

Therefore, premise #2 of the syllogism is incorrect, and the conclusion need not be considered. I find it interesting that a man of such supposed intellectual prowess as Bertrand Russel would make such an easily-answered argument after studying Christianity so much he could write a book on it. A much better argument, in my opinion, would be one based off of the conceded contradiction between God's two wills; the response to that is of course much more complex. But neither Professor Russel nor Karanis made that argument, so I will save it for another time. If the notion that morality comes from God is to be refuted, it must be through means other than this reductio ad absurdum.

Monday, September 04, 2006

Mon, 04 Sep 2006 18:32:38 GMT

Hmm it's been quite a long time. For some reason I just never get around to updating, and I've been mostly off of xanga for a while anyway. I've started to miss it though, so I might start updating regularly, schedule permitting. In my (ridiculously easy) political science class, the professor started out by lecturing on the role of government, and how one's opinion on that greatly influences one's opinions on everything else in politics. So I thought it would be interesting to ask my subscribers:

What is the purpose of government?

Please give a defense of your answer. Just saying "To further the general welfare" or "To protect basic human rights" doesn't help; I think everyone is familiar with the basic theories. What I'm interested in is the justification behind those theories.

Wednesday, December 14, 2005

Wed, 14 Dec 2005 20:26:02 GMT

Gay marriage has been on my mind of late. I don't really have an opinion one way or the other, but I do know that I don't buy most of the arguments made by either side. People sure are passionate about this issue, though, so I thought a discussion on it would be interesting.

It bothers me how liberals accuse conservatives of being intollerant and hating homosexuals. That Christians are morally opposed to gay marriage is to be expected. Marriage, according to their beliefs, is significant of the relationship between Jesus and the Church, and also reflects upon the Trinity. Misusage of marriage is nothing short of blasphemy.

Here's the problem: blasphemy is perfectly legal in the United States. Not only would Christians not want the third commandment legally enforced--blasphemy in the strictest sense of the word, but they contradict themselves when it comes to divorce. According to the Bible, divorce is only an option in cases of sexual unfaithfulness. The vast majority of divorces today are just as dishonoring to marriage as gay marriage would be. Here is a quote from C.S. Lewis:

Before leaving the question of divorce, I should like to distinguish two things which are very often confused. The Christian conception of marriage is one; the other is quite the different question--how far Christians, if they are voters or members of Parliament, ought to try to force their views of marriage on the rest of the community by emobdying them with the divorce laws. A great many people seem to think that if you are a Christian yourself, you should try to make divorce difficult for every one. I do not think that. At least I know I should be very angry if the Mohammedans tried to prevent the rest of us from drinking wine. My own view is that the churches should frankly recognise that the majority of the British people are not Christians and, therefore, cannot be expected to live Christian lives. There ought to be two distinct kinds of marriage: one governed by the State with rules enforced on all citizens, the other governed by the Church with rules enforced by her on her own members. The distinction ought to be quite sharp, so that man knows which couples are married in a Christian sense and which are not. (Mere Christianity, 112)

Replace "divorce" with "gay marriage" and I think you have a very compelling argument for the legalization of homosexual marriage. "It's against the Bible!" only works if you want to argue that everything in the Bible should be legislated by the government.

On the other side, I hear very little arguments for gay marriage, it's mostly the tearing down of anti-gay marriage arguments. I've asked various gay rights activists why gay marriage should be legally recognized, and they almost always come back with "Well, why shouldn't it be recognized?" To be sure, they do have to argue against anti-gay marriage arguments, but it would be an ad ignoratium fallacy to legalize gay marriage soley on the basis that there were no arguments opposing it. The burden of proof is on those who want to change the status quo.

I also don't accept this "You can't restrict the definition of marriage" argument. You have to restrict the definition of marriage, to some degree. I can't marry my computer, after all. The question is whether or not it should be restricted to one man marrying one woman, and that brings us back to the real issue.

So, should the government legally recognize gay marriage and grant homosexuals the same rights as heterosexual couples? If so, why? If not, why not?

On a related note, I've recently been reminded why I like xanga. The people are so funny! You've probably seen the satirical Twelve Reasons Why Gay Marriage is Wrong, or some variant of it. If you haven't, here it is:

1. Homosexuality is not natural, much like eyeglasses, polyester, and birth control.

2. Heterosexual marriages are valid because they produce children. Infertile couples and old people can't legally get married because the world needs more children.

3. Obviously gay parents will raise gay children, since straight parents only raise straight children.

4. Straight marriage will be less meaningful, since Britney Spears' 55-hour just-for-fun marriage was meaningful.

5. Heterosexual marriage has been around a long time and hasn't changed at all; women are property, blacks can't marry whites, and divorce is illegal.

6. Gay marriage should be decided by people not the courts, because the majority-elected legislatures, not courts, have historically protected the rights of the minorities.

7. Gay marriage is not supported by religion. In a theocracy like ours, the values of one religion are imposed on the entire country. That's why we have only one religion in America.

8. Gay marriage will encourage people to be gay, in the same way that hanging around tall people will make you tall.

9. Legalizing gay marriage will open the door to all kinds of crazy behavior. People may even wish to marry their pets because a dog has legal standing and can sign a marriage contract.

10. Children can never succeed without a male and a female role model at home. That's why single parents are forbidden to raise children.

11. Gay marriage will change the foundation of society. Heterosexual marriage has been around for a long time, and we could never adapt to new social norms because we haven't adapted to cars or longer life spans.

12. Civil unions, providing most of the same benefits as marriage with a different name are better, because a separate but equal institution is always constitutional. Separate schools for African-Americans worked just as well as separate marriages for gays and lesbians will.

I think it's hilarious. Most people see this and have a good laugh; occasionally some conservative will angrily try to defend his position and point out that it isn't that idiotic, and that makes it even funnier. But I've never seen this before. Pardon the language, and I strongly recommend you do not browse around on the rest of the site, but this cracked me up: http://www.xanga.com/atheism_incarnate/400537698/item.html.

Sunday, November 27, 2005

Sun, 27 Nov 2005 21:43:02 GMT

My sincerest apologies for not updating since, wow, September. I honestly never intended for it to be this long (Joe, you can stop with the death threats now). My schedule has been overwhelming for quite a while; I didn’t think I could be so busy yet at the same time so bored. The majority of my homework is just tedious and not intellectually stimulating at all. Anyway, I promise I’ll be better about updating from now on.

Four Points on the Five Points

In this brief entry, I am not attempting to prove Calvinism. Nor am I trying to disprove Arminianism. I am merely trying to point out that many objections you hear to Calvinism are actually not limited to it.

First, we need to define the sides. On the one hand we have the Calvinists. Calvinists believe that man is totally depraved in his sin, and unable to turn to God apart from His help. God unconditionally elected certain people before He created the world to spend eternity with Him. Christ died for, and only for, the sins of these elect. Their salvation is certain, and they are unable to resist His will.

Then on the other hand we have those whom I will refer to as the Moderates (I borrow this term from Norman Geisler, who considers himself one). Moderates also believe that an act of God is required to save man from his sinful nature; however, anyone is able to receiving his gift. They also believe in election, yet say that is conditional—God looking into the future and electing those who would freely choose Him. They maintain that Jesus died for the sins of every single person in all of history, and the forgiveness for those sins is actualized when one accepts Christ. Although they agree with Calvinists that a person cannot lose their salvation, they disagree in that they believe man can resist the saving grace of God.

A clear distinction can be seen between these two camps in their different interpretation of Romans 8:29-30: For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. ³⁰And those he predestined, he also called; those he called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified. Moderates claim the “foreknew” proves that God elects based on foreknowledge; Calvinists believe that what is really meant is “foreloved” (Adam “knew” his wife…).

Both sides agree that God is omnipotent and omniscient. They both also agree that a person cannot enter Heaven without hearing of and accepting Jesus as Lord, and all those (of mental capacity) who do not go to Hell.

These are the two groups I will be talking about today. Now, on to the four objections.

#1: There is no point in evangelism.

A Calvinist often hears, “Well if God already planned everything out (concerning salvation) and there is nothing we can do, why bother telling other people the Gospel?” This isn’t a valid objection, but I won’t get into that now. My point today is that a Moderate can turn the question on himself. Both believe there are the elect and the non-elect. Those who are elect are going to Heaven, those who are not are not. The process by which people become elected is irrelevant.

#2: God has a special love for some people that He does not have for others.

It has always puzzled me as to why people cannot stand the thought of God loving some more than others in the New Testament (Romans 9), but at the same time they have no problem with it in the Old Testament. God clearly chose Israel and displayed a special undeserved affection on them, yet not on all the other nations.

#3: God creates people who have no chance to go to Heaven.

Calvinists claim that God elected a certain few to go Heaven, and the rest of mankind goes to Hell. Although the Moderate would say that God wishes all to be saved, they must realize this is not possible. People in third-world countries die every day without ever hearing the name Jesus. Hell was inevitable for them, yet God created these people anyway.

#4: God is an egoist.

This last one is so obvious I almost did not include it. All Christians must admit that God’s own glory is more important to Him than human happiness. If it were not, there would be no suffering. Moderates explain the existence of evil by saying God was more pleased with people who could freely love him than being forced to do so. Thus, he created humans with free will. Some love Him, yet most do not, and must spend eternity in Hell because of that. If God’s main focus were humans, He wouldn’t have set it up the way he did.

These four questions a Moderate must answer as well as a Calvinist. If Calvinism is to be disproved, it must be by other means.

Sunday, September 11, 2005

Sun, 11 Sep 2005 20:54:43 GMT

This is probably the most contoversial, emotionally-charged topic I know of. It's been on my mind a lot lately, and I wanted to hear some more opinions on it.

It is, of course, abortion.

I would greatly appreciate any insights anyone may have; I'd love it if we could have a civil, intelligent discussion on abortion. So, here are some initial questions I'd like people to try to answer:

Is abortion always morally justified?

Is abortion in cases of rape morally justified?

Is abortion morally justified to save the mother's life?

Is abortion morally justified for the sake of the mother's health (her life is not in danger)?

Is partial-birth abortion morally justified?

Is infanticide morally justified?

And then you can ask all those questions again, but instead of asking whether it's moral, ask whether or not it should be legal. Just some questions to get discussion going.

Now I know everyone has a very strong opinion on this, but please keep your emotions out of it. I'm looking for logical arguments here. Please do not post something like "ABORTION IS MURDER!!!!" or "ITS THE WOMANS CHOICE!!!!" because that doesn't help at all. Explain your position, and give rational justification for it. Don't stoop to the level of using ad hominem attacks either.

I'm not going to state my opinion here, and that's in part due to the fact that I don't have a concrete position on all these issues. I will, however, ask questions about other people's arguments, and maybe point out flaws I see.

I'd like to have all this discussion on this entry; check back here for responses rather than on your site.

I'll say one more thing: be open-minded and tolerant. The pro-choicer should keep this in mind: to you, sure this is an important issue, but to the pro-lifer, it's much more. It's mass murder. So please be considerate, and I would say the same to the pro-lifer. There are good arguments on both sides here.

That said, please comment!