mr_jargon's Xanga

Geisler on the Nature of the Necessary Existent

Sun, 29 Jun 2008 22:40:00 GMT

[Note: I have posted the following lengthy quotation to initiate discussion on the validity & implications of Geisler's arguments concerning the nature of the Necessary Existent, not to construct a theistic argument. Geisler makes eight points concerning the nature of the Necessary Existent. He argues that it must be (1) Pure Actuality, (2) Changeless, (3) Nontemporal & Nonspatial, (4) Eternal, (5) One, (6) Absolutely Simple, (7) "Infinite" & (8) Uncaused. I have separated the numbered points in order to make them easier to read.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

"A necessary existence is one that cannot not exist. The nonexistence of a necessary Being is impossible. If there is a necessary Being, then it must exist necessarily. There is no other way a necessary Being could exist than to exist necessarily.

(1) What is more, a necessary existence would be pure actuality with no potentiality whatsoever. If it had any potentiality with regard to its existence, then it would be possible for it not to exist. But this is precisely what a necessary existence cannot do; it is not possible for a necessary existence not to exist. Therefore, a necessary existence would be pure actuality with no potentiality in its being whatsoever.

(2) Also, a necessary existence would be changeless. Whatever changes must have the possibility for change. If change were impossible then it could not change. But a necessary Being has no possibility whatsoever.

(3) A necessary existence would have to be a nontemporal and nonspatial existence. If space and time involve a change of position and moment, then a necessary existence could not be either spatial or temporal in its being. Its being cannot change, and both space and time involve change.

(4) Further, a necessary existence would have to be eternal. If it ever did not exist, then it would be a possible existence. But it has no possibility at all with regard to nonexistence. Whatever comes to be is not a necessary existence, for whatever comes to be moves from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality with regard to existence. And a necessary Being has no potentiality whatsoever. Likewise, for the same reason a necessary Being could not ever cease to be. It has no possibility for nonexistence either.

(5) There can be only one necessary existence. What is pure actuality must be one since there is no way for one thing to differ from another in its being unless there is some real potentiality for differentiation. But in a being of pure actuality there is no potential whatsoever. Hence, there there is no real differentiation in it. All of it is one; there cannot be two or more, since neither would really be different from the other in its being.

(6) A necessary existence would have to be simple and undivided. It could not be composed of different parts or elements, there is no principle of differentiation in it; all is simply one. Further, whatever is composed could be decomposed or destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the existence of a necessary Being. If it exists at all, then it must be, and it cannot not be. Hence, a necessary existence must be simple and undivided.

(7) A necessary existence would have to be infinite in whatever attributes it possesses. If it is knowing, then it must be all-knowing. If powerful, then it must be all-powerful. If good, then it must be all-good. The reason for this is simple enough: only what has potentiality can be limited. Limitation means that which differentiates the sphere of one thing from another. Pure actuality is being pure and simple; everything else only has being in one form or another depending on its limiting potential. The only limitations on pure actuality are those of possibility outside it. Even pure actuality could not know or perform the impossible.

(8) Finally, a necessary Being must be an uncaused being. Whatever is caused passes from potentiality to actuality, for that is what causality means. But a necessary Being has no potentiality and it cannot change. Therefore, it is clear that a necessary Being cannot be caused. And since a self-caused being is impossible, it must be concluded that a necesary Being is an uncaused being."

[Norman Geisler, Christian Apologetics, p. 239-240]

Enlightenment Ethics

Tue, 03 Jun 2008 02:33:30 GMT

On what basis do certain humans exploit lower animals and yet consistently assert that other humans possess equal rights irrespective of their individual capacities & abilities in the framework of metaphysical naturalism? I have seen two answers:

(1.1) Biological likeness of the human species.
(2.1) Unique rational potentialities of the humanity-in-general.

Neither (1.1) nor (2.1) offers a stable basis for both the exploitation of non-human animals *and* the claim that each member of the human species possess equal claim to certain inalienable rights. Nevertheless, ExtremeGoatMaster asserts in response to one of my comments that:

You shouldn't treat a human being like an animal because human beings think and feel on a much higher level than their animal counterparts.

This obviously does not apply to each and every member of the human species at every stage of development, and it's always the case that these capacities are actualized in different persons in differing degrees. It could be (easily) deduced from the above statement that:

(1.2) Humans (or groups of humans) who think more proficiently (& feel more deeply) are indeed better and worthy of more dignity and better treatment than other humans who do not do so as well.
(2.2) Extremely young children & higher animals possess the same worth according to use of rational capacities.
(3.2) As rational humans exploit less rational beasts, so wise humans have the right to command less rational humans.

Question & Answer Post

Sat, 24 May 2008 15:40:10 GMT

This is an old tradition of mine that I wish to revive. Here are the rules:

(1) Until May 31st, each person gets to ask me up to three questions.
(2) After May 31st, I will put the remaining questions together and answer them in an upcoming post.
(3) Questions may not be answered in order.
(4) Certain questions may be deferred to later post.

PS: I will try to answer questions as they come, but when I tried this before it became unmanageable.
PS2: I am leaving for this conference. Expect few comments from me until Monday.

The Injured Physicalist

Tue, 20 May 2008 00:21:30 GMT

X: Somebody shot me! Call the ambulance!
Y: Define 'me.'
X: My leg you idiot, it's bleeding!
Y: So your leg is a person?
X: NO!
Y: Then nobody was shot, correct?
X: What?!
Y: Unless you are your leg or your leg is a person, then nobody was shot, and thus there is no need to call the ambulance.
X: Hand me your cell phone now!
Y: First 'me' was your leg & now 'me' is your hand? You contradict yourself. State plainly whether or not 'me' is your leg or your hand.
X: BOTH!
Y: How can your hand and your leg be the same person? It would follow that whatever is predicated of one must be predicable of the other. Therefore, if your hand is physically unharmed, then your leg must be whole as well and thus I have no reason to handover the phone because there's been rampant deception from the start.
X: I can't believe this...
Y: Who's "I?"
X: ME!
Y: Here we go again...

[Copyright @ W.Ballow 2008]

Forks in the Road

Sat, 17 May 2008 00:06:29 GMT

The reason I do not believe any member of the following set of propositions to be true:

(1.1) Reality is (a) a self-existent, causally closed matter-energy system or (b) an unstructured blob of quantum particles.
(2.1) All mental events in the human brain are either chance-occurrences or necessary effects of prior physical causes.

is that they singly & collectively eliminate all conceivable reasons to hold that any member of the following set is true:

(1.2) Objective moral values & intrinsic goods exist & we possess some knowledge of them.
(2.2) The motions of subjective reason to grasp necessary relations in objective reality are truth-conducive.
(3.2) An X-wise appearance provides me with good reason to believe that some X exists.
(4.2) I am a unique person with an enduring identity (with reason and free choice.)

Monday, May 12, 2008

Mon, 12 May 2008 16:41:00 GMT

Two Transcendental Arguments from Evil

1) If God exists, then God has sufficient power to prevent all instances of non-disciplinary evil.
2) If God exists, then God has sufficient motive to prevent all instances of non-disciplinary evil.
3) Non-disciplinary evil exists.
4) If non-disciplinary evil exists and God exists, then either God must lack either sufficient power or sufficient motive to prevent non-disciplinary evil.
5) Therefore, God doesn't exist.

1) If NNT (naturalistic non-theism) is true, then objective moral values do not exist.
2) If NNT is true, then intrinsic goods do not exist.
2) If objective moral values & intrinsic goods do not exist, then evil (loss in relation to objective value or intrinsic good) does not exist.
3) Evil exists.
4) If evil exists, then objective moral values & intrinsic goods must exist.
5) Therefore, NNT is false.

My position is that both arguments are cogent.

EDIT: Over 40 comments in and I am surprised no has asked this already; but assuming the form of the arguments is valid, how would someone come to grasp the meaning and know the truth of the premises?

The Super Problem of Evil

Thu, 08 May 2008 12:03:00 GMT

Consider the following dilemma:

1) If God exists, then God has sufficient power to eliminate all evil.
2) If God exists, then God has sufficient motive to eliminate all evil.
3) Evil exists.
4) If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil or lacks the desire to eliminate all evil.
5) Therefore, God doesn't exist.

The relevant terms (God, evil, power, motive, existence, etc.) can be qualified in different ways, but however one goes about it, the Christian must concede at least the following:

P1: There is some possible/actual of affairs where created agents possess freedom and fixity in virtue. (Heaven)

(P1) seems to undercut each and every possible free will defense available to the Christian, for the traditional Free Will Defense making the possibility of evil a necessary condition of human freedom, but that cannot be if (P1) is true. The problems do not stop here; it gets worse. Augustinians who subscribe to Scholastic, Reformed &/or Evangelical theology must make one more concession:

P2: It is the case that God could have created a world with free and perfectly virtuous human persons from the beginning.

It certainly seems that the Christian who believes that P1 & P2 are true must come to terms with a much more powerful POE.

Monday, May 05, 2008

Mon, 05 May 2008 16:42:31 GMT

Response to H_Loves_C

Among the blogs I read on occasion is H_Loves_C. Why? Because it's healthy to expose oneself to alternative views, and although I think the polemic and insults to Christianity found there are pretty extreme, I can identify with some of the legitimate ethical-emotional concerns which underly them. Under each post it states:

Before you leave any feedback, please refer to my entries on evidence, and the FAQ at least. If you have questions specifically regarding atheism as such, please refer to the entry on atheism. (Items in red are links) I do not respond to all comments. Are you wondering why I have a whole xanga dedicated to religion, when I don't believe in any of it? Click here. Can I prove to you that your god does NOT exist? Click here ***

Now I plan on doing better than reading each of these referenced pages; I plan on offering (hopefully substantive) commentary on each one, starting with the last page on proof:

Do not ask an atheist to prove that God does not exist. EVER. Here's why:

Atheism is divided into the "weak" and "strong" positions. Both reject theism. The strong one would affirm that there is no god. In that regard, you could potentially say that it contains an affirmation, a claim, even if it is a negative one. Atheism is the rejection of theism. It's so simple! As such, though, atheism in itself (especially the weak position) makes no claims of any sort, it has no actual content, so there is really nothing to defend, nor nothing to prove. It is merely a position that says "I am not a theist."

Many of the claims made above are demonstrably false. Weak atheism is simply the absence of belief in (rather than the ''rejection'' of) theism; it involves no knowledge-truth claim. Strong atheism, as opposed to weak atheism, not only involves a knowledge-truth claim, it carries with it a burden of proof. According to Austin Cline:

"Because knowledge claims are involved, strong atheism carries an initial burden of proof which does not exist for weak atheism. Any time a person asserts that some god or any gods do not or cannot exist, they obligate themselves to support their claims. ...A strong atheist, ..., may be a weak atheist by definition, but by adopting that label the person is in effect communicating a willingness and interest to take a much more proactive role in theological debates. They are more likely to assert right up front that a particular god does not or cannot exist and then make a case for that, even if the theist doesn’t do much to defend the position of belief."

The above is sufficient to falsify the claim that this page sets out to prove. Moving on:

Our default position is always disbelief in things/creatures UNTIL evidence of their existence is provided. The evidence for the existence of a being or creature has to be sufficient if we are to accept it, BEFORE we accept it. Asking for evidence of the NON-existence of a being is epistemologically absurd.

This is actually false also. Disbelief is defined as the "mental rejection of something as untrue" rather than the simple absence of assent. It is also not (as was already established) 'epistemologically absurd' to ask for the evidence in support of a positive claim.

Think about it, and think about it without any special bias favoring your particular creature or deity. Even Christians themselves do not believe in a myriad of creatures and deities, yet I'm SURE that they cannot provide sufficient evidence that those creatures/deities do not exist. Do you believe in magic elves? Unicorns? Zeus? I will guess that your answer would be an emphatic "no." Can you PROVE to me or show me convincing evidence that those creatures or deities do not exist? I doubt it.

Generally speaking, Christians (both Augustinian and non-Augustinian) would deny that God belongs in the category of contingently existing material objects (magic elves, unicorns, Zeus), and influential non-theistic epistemologists like David Hume, Betrand Russell and Quine have denied that there is conclusive sensory evidence to logically necessitate belief in the existence of mind-independent material objects and other minds.

Therefore, epistemologically, the default position is to reject the existence of creatures/things/deities, unless sufficient evidence can be shored up to substantiate the claim that they exist. Your demand for evidence of the non-existence of your god is unwarranted, illogical, and unfair. In fact, it is one of the classic theistic maneuvers, and it's getting old. Do some research into philosophy, epistemology, and the burden of proof. I hope this clarifies the "strong" atheist position.

I have done *some* research into philosophy, epistemology and the burden of proof, and I have yet to see how the active rejection of theism is "standard issue epistemology," if there even is such a thing. I actually have no idea what epistemology the author(s) of this blog subscribe to, be it rationalism, empiricism, coherentism, constructivism, contextualism, foundationalism, etc. The merits of consistent empiricism are quite disputable, and I think serious study of the history of philosophy will render this clear. Appeals to 'common sense' will not get the job done either.

Since the evidence for the existence of the Christian God (and all gods) has been found to be insufficient, God can be said to not exist in the same breath that we can say that Zeus or magic elves do not exist. Also, when you speak of the characteristics of the Christian God, and realize that many of them cancel each other out, or are simply nonsense, we can rightfully deny the existence of such a being. Much like we can certainly affirm that a married bachelor, or a square circle cannot exist. Omnipotence and omniscience contradict each other (I will not get into this - too involved. Research it on your own).

I agree that there is no conclusive neutral evidence for Christianity, but then again there is no 'evidence' for anything apart from some accepted epistemological context and ontological framework. I also agree that the moment I came to realize that the Christian God cannot exist, I would be able to rightfully deny his existence, but that's a fairly trivial truth.

The quality of "perfection" also is out of place in the Christian God, when you consider some of his other qualities. On top of that, saying that God loves us, or worse yet, that he IS love, is patently incompatible with his behavior in the Bible, especially the OT. No amount of apologetic verbal acrobatics can excuse it, nor is context ("you're taking it out of context") a sufficient excuse for a being that is allegedly eternal and perfect.

This is indeed a critical issue in Jewish-Christian exegetical history. Allow me to quote from the Abstract of the linked dissertation, for it articulates my own position on the matter.:

"The problem of theodicy pales in comparison with a literal reading of texts where God commands Israel to massacre infants, women and children. Whether it happened in reality or only in the text is not as significant as one might at first suppose. In either case, God is portrayed as standing behind the practice. This God is either beyond morality, or, as many modern scholars believe, Israel misunderstood what God had revealed. In the former case, one's view of God's character suffers. In the latter, one's trust in Israel as a faithful witness to God's words and deeds is severely eroded.

I believe that the herem is best understood as hyperbole. When read against its ancient Near Eastern background and in its biblical context, it becomes clear that the original writers and readers would have understood it as such. My approach is consciously interdisciplinary and takes seriously the contributions of archaeology, historical criticism, systematic theology, and the history of exegesis.

Augustine's belief in a literal herem was a repudiation of four centuries of non-literal exegesis of the ban. The literal view of the herem which has reigned since Augustine led Christians to conclude that God is capable of commanding genocide. The Crusades were only the most visible example of the deleterious effect of a literal view of the herem. The damage done to humanity's view of God's character has been even more far-reaching. In sharp contrast, most modern scholars have refused to accept a literal herem as coming from God; they assume that Israel simply misunderstood God. But this view has exacerbated a crisis of confidence in the Old Testament as revelation. I believe that the herem, when read in its ancient Near Eastern and biblical context, was intended as hyperbole."

The post concludes:

There you go. I hope that's enough to make it clear. If it is not, then it is hopeless to argue. Anyone which is entirely unable to grasp the foregoing, is not someone I will spend one second of my time responding to.

Perhaps, perhaps not. I would probably concur just so long as 'understanding' is not equated with agreement.

Kickless Carrier

Sun, 04 May 2008 00:01:10 GMT

I recently purchased and have been carefully reading through Richard Carrier's Sense & Goodness Without God: A Defense of Metaphysical Naturalism. Needless to say, I have been largely disappointed by the depth, clarity and cogency of the arguments contained therein. I mean, it did raise many interesting questions, but my Eastern Christian worldview was neither shocked nor shaken in the manner that I had hoped/expected it to be. This series of posts will address some of the points raised and arguments presented in this book.

Carrier claims to be a fan of Betrand Russell, but I would never suspect such a thing from reading this book. Betrand Russell was an extremely anti-metaphysical empiricist and ethical non-cognitivist. Carrier is a self-confessed "foundationalist," (eliminative?) "materialist," and ethical realist, but he's really just a selective empiricist who just *assumes* a whole bunch of things he can't know by his own standards in order to reach desired conclusions. Let's look at what they have to say on the meaning of life.

Russell: ...even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which Science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins -- all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built. (A Free Man's Worship)

Powerful prose, indeed. From this vantage point, one can see the clear connection between consistent empiricism, the suppression of ultimate questions, and the emergence of modern existentialism. Now let's see what Carrier has to say:

Carrier: Neither existing by accident nor existing only a short while change ANYTHING about the value of existing, the value of getting to be and to know the universe, to create something. (p. 161, emphasis added)

His own ultra-scientific epistemology and materialist paradigm permits only one possible categorization for this careless raising of an individual subjective impression to the level of objective fact against grain of human history and common experience: complete bullshit. More to come.