Good history.


larry

I know all about the OPC and the PCA, I've been a member of both and still a memmber of the PCA. Emergent church theology really I believe is just a lame attempt to take out the certainty in belief... because they find it pompous and arrogant to be certain about anything. So in order to LOOK enlightened, they always have to say, "well I believe such and such, but I could be wrong." Now to some degree, that statement could be acceptable. But when it becomes a distinctive charataristic of your view of Christian doctrine, the doctrines these people hold becomes "washed out" and weak. Why even waste time going to a church like that? If they are right, God might not even exist, then it would have been a complete waste of time.

Agreed - excellent explanation.

People are probably going to jump on you for equating the "emerging conversation" and the old theological liberalism. There is more to it than that, and it probably has more redeeming qualities than its predecessor as well. That said, I gratefully doubt it will last very long.

Brian, you always know how to hit the nail on the head! Great stuff. Thanks for sharing.

Andy---I really think that if you read _Christianity and Liberalism_ by Machen you'd be shocked. Both are huge on the social gospel, both reject knowing scripture with certainty or as true at all, both see Christianity as mainly a system of ethics or "way of life" in the vague sense of the phrase, etc. I think their biggest differences are stylistic.

Interesting post.  Most of my comments are picky about the details -- some are just elaborations of your points.

Many of the "fundamentalists" were old-earthers -- the compromise started way back in the 18th century.  Even Scofield, BB Warfield, and Hodge were modernist old-earthers.

"Proponents of Old Earth Creationism include Hugh Ross, David Snoke, Greg Neyman, Francis Schaeffer, and Norman Geisler".  See http://www.conservapedia.com/Old_Earth_Creationism  Also Gleason Archer, John Ankerberg, and Walter Kaiser. 

There's a list of people "open to an old-earth interpretation.  I am not "open" to an old-earth interpretation, but I will talk to people who are. 

For people to move from YE to OE or vice-versa takes a paradigm shift (a la Kuhn).  That requires a bit of time to explain enough to enable them to make the jump.  OE and YE are very different ways of thinking.  Not all new scientific theories require paradigm shifts, but the "historical" sciences tend to require it as well as relativity, quantum physics, etc.

I've been reading a lot of philosophy lately -- 50+ books and papers, so I can understand your vocab.  You lean heavily upon Van Til and Clark.  Clark had a great deal in common with Paul Feyerabend in his philosophy of science -- he had a great deal of relativism in his views on science.  Not to say that Feyerabend and Clark didn't make some valid points.

You stated: "postmodernism and modernism are close cousins"  In what way?  How do they differ?  Is it really terribly helpful to always be polemic?  Is it possible that in order to persuade we have to abandon polemicism?

I must differ with you regarding the philosophy of science of most scientists today.  They are probably realists -- not positivists.  Read Larry Laudan for an update on modern philosophy of science.  Philosophy of science is still thrashing about in quicksand -- mostly because they are trying to deal with theory selection, which is the most interesting part of philosophy of science.  They need to get their epistemology straight first in order to be able to do any useful work in theory selection, IMO.

Nancy Pearcey's book about the history of science was one of the most interesting books I read recently.  I will ask for it for it as a Christmas present.  I will probably refer back to it a lot.

Hey soccerdad,

Some of the old Princeton theologians were old-earthers, yes, but then again many of them weren't.

I would define rationalism and empiricism as modernist, therefore we could say that some people who called themselves fundamentalists had a modernist epistemology.

Postmodernism and modernism are close cousins and this is a great point... whether one thinks its polemical is a matter of opinion. The reality is that both hold man and not God as the ultimate authority.

Keith

Christianity and Liberalism was one of the better books I have read this past year. Sadly, the issues the that Machen dealt with are the same issues that are being dealt with today. I think every college student going to a public university should read this book.

Keith: "Some of the old Princeton theologians were old-earthers, yes, but then again many of them weren't."

So where did the young-earthers at Princeton go?  Princeton today is very liberal.  The YEC's lost the battle at Princeton.  In fact, by the 19th century, most of the church had accepted an old earth.  Van Til started his apologetics work at Princeton because he was convinced that the intellectual battle couldn't be won using evidentiary arguments.

If evidentiary argumentation is modernist, then Van Til was an early post-modernist.  In common with Kierkegaard, Van Til seems to think that an a priori belief is all that one can have -- for Van Til it is scripture, while for Kierkegaard it is theological doctrine.  Both rejected evidentiary arguments. 

Duane Gish, Henry Morris, and John Woodmorappe have done more for apologetics than Van Til.  America maintains a sizeable proportion of creationists -- much larger than Europe.  Again, not to say that Van Til didn't make useful contributions.

Soccerdad, the battle at Princeton wasn't over the age of the earth, it was over modernism. And the fact is that many of the Old Princeton theologians were evidentialists in what I would call their "popular apologetics". However, in their heart of hearts I think they would admit that God is the authority over all knowledge.

Van Til started his apologetics work because we was a Calvinist and wanted a truly reformed epistemology. Evidentialism really didn't become popular until guys like John Warwick Montgomery and Edward Carnell (who was one of Van Til's students, incidentally) came along. Van Til was more focused on modernism.

Van Til didn't reject evidential arguments (not to be confused with evidentialist arguments). He has stated this clearly in his works. Many evidentialists will admit this but then go on to say that Van Til and other presuppers only pay "lip service" to evidemces, meaning they think that if Van Til truly didn't mind evidences then he would have actually used them. The reason he didn't use them is because he was an epistemology---that was his area of expertise. Furthermore, epistemology arguments are far more devastating to the unbelieving worldview. Evidences, on the other hand, always have to be taken on some scholar's authority. Therefore the apologists most suited to use evidences are those who actually study biology, geology, astronomy, archaeology, etc.

Furthermore, postmodernism isn't merely being "non-modern"---that's a terrible way to look at postmodernism, which is characterized by an entire worldview of its own.

Van Til didn't consider scripture a priori knowledge. Clark did.

Duane Gish, Henry Morris, and John Woodmorappe have done more for apologetics than Van Til.

Of course you will say this---you're an evidentialist. But as one who's studied creationism for 6 years and presuppositionalism for 2, I can say that this is simply not a reasonable opinion. Apologetics is foremostly a matter of epistemology, not evidences. Evidences are merely one part of apologetics, whereas epistemology is part and parcel with apologetics. And Van Til's contributions to Christian epistemology are staggeringly brilliant and valuable.

Ben: "Soccerdad, the battle at Princeton wasn't over the age of the earth, it was over modernism"

I would say that the acceptance of an old earth was the camel's nose of modernism.  Slippery-slope, etc. attacking the credibility of scripture.

"A number of Old Princeton professors, including Charles and A. A. Hodge, B. B. Warfield, J. Gresham Machen, and Oswald T. Allis, held that the days of creation were not literally twenty-four hours long. Edward J. Young, who taught Old Testament at Westminster for many years, held that the days referred to long ages of time. [40] In 1957, Meredith G. Kline published an article, “Because it Had Not Rained,” [41] arguing not only that the days were non-literal, but that the narrative does not even teach a temporal sequence of events. Following N. H. Ridderbos, [42] Kline argued that the list of days is a literary framework that has no implications for the length of time or the sequence of events. So in the Reformed community, some have held to literal days, others to age-long days, and others to symbolic days. These positions coexisted fairly comfortably in Reformed churches until around 1980. "  http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/2003Machen.htm  The Reformed theologians had already given up essential terrain.

"Van Til didn't consider scripture a priori knowledge. Clark did."

Actually, from reading Van Til here -- http://reformed.org/master/index.html?mainframe=/apologetics/sce/cvt_sce_contents.html

and about Clark here -- http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/101a-AnIntroductiontoGordonHClark.pdf

I gather that Van Til, like Clark, considers scripture a priori knowledge.  However, he does not consider that it must be used deductively in apologetics, unlike Clark.  Clark is essentially a warmed-over Aristotelian who begins from some scriptural axioms.  Aquinas did the same thing.  Plus ca change....

"Furthermore, postmodernism isn't merely being "non-modern"---that's a terrible way to look at postmodernism, which is characterized by an entire worldview of its own."

I don't understand your point.  Are answering mine about Clark's relativistic philosophy of science?  Or are you denying that Clark's philosophy of science was relativistic?  Post-modernism borrows heavily from relativism.  It had a major impact on Clark.

"Apologetics is foremostly a matter of epistemology, not evidences. Evidences are merely one part of apologetics"

I don't understand your division.  How do apologetics, evidences, and epistemology relate, in your view?

Here's an interesting criticism of Van Til.  http://www.trinityfoundation.org/PDF/182a-VanTilsApologetic-ReadingsAnalysis.pdf#search='bahnsencriticismvan%20til'

"D. R. Trethewie describes Van Til's system as nothing more than "a priori dogmatic transcendental irrationalism, which he has attempted to give a Christian name to"  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornelius_Van_Til#Writings  Clark followed Van Til's path to some extent, retaining Van Til's a priori dogmatism and transcendentalism.  Again, this leans heavily towards post-modernism.

I should clarify. What I like about the emergent church movement is its criticism of "pop evangelicalism" - picture any given megachurch where they substitute entertainment for worship, self-help pep talks for preaching, banks of video game consoles for actual discipleship at youth group, "programs" for actual ministry, etc.

My admiration for emergent trails off after that point - they can criticize well, but haven't offered viable alternatives. I should very much like to read that book of Machen's (maybe I'll pick it up after I read the other two of his that are currently on my shelf), and I know all too well how man-centered emergent acolytes can be. Being pastorless, our church has a recurrent guest preacher of that school, and even my 15-year-old brother observed some of the same failings in his messages as you listed above.

Thanks for those insights, Andy. I agree 100%. The emergent church seems to point out a few valid problems with the church but then goes down an equal problematic trail in response.

--------

Soccerdad,

I agree 100% that the Old Princeton theologians were foolish in abandoning a literal interpretation of Genesis. This no doubt worked against them. And I am familiar with Kline's framework hypothesis.

I can't find a place in the link you gave where Van Til mentions scripture as a priori knowledge.

If Clark was even slightly Aristotelian then he would be an empiricist, yet Clark was probably more ardent in his attacks against empirical knowledge than any other philosopher I've never known. Clark had a lot to offer, but he had serious blunders, namely in his unwillingness to accept that Christianity can be proven and his belief in scripturalism.

Post-modernism borrows heavily from relativism. It had a major impact on Clark.

I have no idea where you're getting this from... I don't think you really understand postmodernism. Just because someone is "beyond" modernism or "against" modernism does not make them postmodern.

I don't understand your division. How do apologetics, evidences, and epistemology relate, in your view?

Evidences are one of the ways in which God shows people that He is the Lord but they do not justify one's knowledge of God. One must have the correct paradigm through which these evidences can be interpreted, and such a paradigm is received only through a previous knowledge of God---one that comes from general or special revelation.

I've read and heard much of what the John Robbins crowd has to say about Van Til---I think its all very weak, although I'm not going to take the time to explain it here. But things like "true presuppositionalists know they can't prove God" is silly---all they've done is defined "presupposition" as unprovable in the first place! But if they understood the form of an proof (valid form and true premises) then they would see why its them who is messing up on the basics.

The critique of science is important but needs to be qualified a tremendous amount. And scripturalism certainly isn't the answer to the problems of induction.

Trethwise sounds like the typical Joe that doesn't understand Van Til. Fideism (what he calls irrationalism) is faith in faith; Van Til didn't believe this. Trethwise's problem is that he thinks appealing to God as the ultimate authority is non-philosophical, maybe even a cop out.

Ben: "I can't find a place in the link you gave where Van Til mentions scripture as a priori knowledge."

Van Til doesn't state it explicitly, but he avoids claiming that empirical evidence can be used to validate scripture.  He sees scripture as history as well as proposition.  Van Til talks about the history of the resurrection

Ben: "If Clark was even slightly Aristotelian then he would be an empiricist,"

Actually, I was referring to Clark's deductive method.  Perhaps you didn't know that Aristotle developed the deductive logic.  Plato didn't really have it down, though he kind of fiddled with it.  Aristotle was not a real empiricist in the modern sense.  He eschewed experiments, though he was an observer of nature.  Surprisingly, so were the Scholastics.  Their main contribution was to break with Aristotle's axioms.

Ben: "I have no idea where you're getting this from"

As I said before, I got them from Clark's writings on philosophy of science.  His ideas run parallel with those of Paul Feyerabend in his criticism of modernistic science using relativistic attacks.

In "Philosophy of Science and Belief in God", Clark attacks science for not being perfectly accurate and for changing its theories; from this he asserts that science cannot present the Truth.  Clark asserts that scientists work in a relativistic framework.  This is also Feyerabend's method.  This is not to say that there is not some validity to what Clark and Feyerabend say.  However, I think that Clark did not understand some things about science or what scripture says about the study of nature or some of the implications of his relativistic criticisms.  This is still a problem in much of philosophy of science today.

Ben: "One must have the correct paradigm through which these evidences can be interpreted, and such a paradigm is received only through a previous knowledge of God"

So, you are a Kuhnian?  His ideas about paradigms were in the context of philosophy of science, but there's no reason the logic couldn't be applied outside of philosophy of science.  Kuhn was also a relativist.  The whole "worldview" thing is very Kuhnian.  Again, not to say that it's completely or mostly wrong -- it's just interesting.

Ben: "And scripturalism certainly isn't the answer to the problems of induction."

Could you elaborate?

Ben: "Trethwise's problem is that he thinks appealing to God as the ultimate authority is non-philosophical"

Well, philosophy can't give us the basic axioms that philosophy requires -- that requires revelation.  Archimedes' principle still holds, "Give me a rock and a lever and a place to stand on and I can move the world."  Philosophy cannot provide the rock, though once there is a rock it can be used effectively.

However, God revealed Himself in history.  Revelation is more than a mere set of axioms and logic.  I think that Clark's dangerous because he emphasizes philosophy to the detriment of history; history is far more important to the Christian faith, as Van Til recognized.  But then, Clark was primarily a philosopher.

but he avoids claiming that empirical evidence can be used to validate scripture.

Agreed... that's what any presuppositionalist believes. But this doesn't mean that we consider our knowledge of scripture a priori (save the Clarkians).

Perhaps you didn't know that Aristotle developed the deductive logic.

I see what you're driving at, but I would say that logic isn't something you "develop," its a priori. Just because Aristotle wrote out the rules of deduction doesn't mean I'm going to call myself Aristotelian.

Clark asserts that scientists work in a relativistic framework.

Still, that wouldn't make him a postmodernist.

So, you are a Kuhnian

Just because I use the word "paradigm" doesn't mean I'm a Kuhnian. It sounds like you've read a lot lately, learned who the major proponents of various schools of thought were, etc... and now you're going around finding similarities between X and Y and concluding that Y must be a follower of X. But just because a car transports people doesn't mean its an airplane. So while its good to notice parallels in people's thinking, its not always good to conclude that one was a student of the other.

Could you elaborate?

Scripturalism holds that the only truth we have are the propositions of scripture and whatever can be deduced from them. Of course, this rules out propositions like "I am saved" and "Clark exists" and "I am sinning right now." If we can't receive any knowledge whatsoever from our senses then life is a mess.

Anyway, I agree that revelation is required to do philosophy at all, which is why Greg Bahnsen would tell non-believing philosophers that his theology could save their philosophy (since unbelieving philosophy always reduces to skepticism). But using revelation as a starting point requires one to hold the Revealer as the authority, something that even many Christians are unwilling to do.

It looks to me like relativism and postmodernism amount to about the same thing.  When Clark used relativistic arguments against science, I think you can safely say that in terms of his philosophy of science he is postmodern.  Of course his ethics are foundationalist and two-valued (good/evil).  Clark's use of relativism stems from his apologetics, wherein like many Christian theologians and philosophers, he saw no arguments other than postmodern that could be used effectively against scientific triumphalism (aka positivism or scientism).

I see quite a few biblical arguments against scientism that can be used.  It requires a paradigm shift.  LOL

I don't think you understand Clark or postmodernism...

Have you read Clark's book on philosophy of science or have you read Feyerabend or even a Wiki on postmodernism?  Have you read Laudan on philosophy of science or Lakatos, Quine, or Duhem?

As for history and sociology of science, have you read Pearcey or Shapin?  Do you even understand the history behind Van Til and Clark -- why they did what they did and their historical context?  If so, you wouldn't say such things.  You have approximately two decades of experience with maybe four years of intellectual experience.  You should be more humble and ask questions instead of deriding the opinions of someone with considerably more intellectual experience.

The following review of Clark is quite good:

http://butler-harris.org/archives/245#more-245

Harris: "6. Clark insists that we don’t know a quantity unless we know it precisely." 

This is a relativistic argument and shows Clark's relativistic bent in his philosophy of science.  Also, Clark never proved that God cares about precision or that precision has anything to do with absolute truth.  See my next point regarding the irrelevance of science to truth.  But again, Clark's purpose, which must never be forgotten when reading his philosophy of science, was an apologetic against modernism.  To do this, he borrowed heavily from postmodernism.

Harris: "Clark’s point that science does not really explain in a philosophical sense (36) is well taken"

Yes, and this point has been made by many others as well.

Harris: "Clark admitted that he didn’t “know” that the woman he was sleeping with was his wife; but he had a strong opinion about it."

More proof of Clark's relativism.

Clark was incorrect when he said that science was always false.  He should have said, like the scripture, "for we know in part...."  Science is imperfect, or incomplete, not "always false."

Clark also ignores the biblical mandate to subdue the earth as regards science; clearly science is involved in fulfilling this mandate.

Clark feebly presented operationalism as a rationale for science, but he didn't offer any epistemological basis for science.

Read about Feyerabend here:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feyerabend/

neb: "Modernism began with Enlightenment thinking and Cartesian foundationalism. The epistemological commonality between these two is autonomous human reasoning---man can reason apart from God."

Descartes would not say that man can arrive at truth apart from God.  To drag down foundationalism with the Endarkenment is an ontological and epistemological error.  Just because Descartes does not begin with scripture does not mean that he considers God irrelevant to human knowledge.

The Endarkenment presupposed anti-supernaturalism.  Cartesians did not.

In discussing relativism with my daughter, I believe that I understand why you are confused about relativism.  You consider only the ontological aspect of it -- that relativism asserts that there is no absolute truth.  However, there is an epistemological (philosophers would call this the weak) version of relativism that allows that while absolute truth may exist, we cannot know what it is.  It is this sense of it that Clark asserts in his philosophy of science, which is why I claim that he uses relativistic arguments and is actually an early post-modern, like Van Til.  Of course Clark argues that absolute truth exists, in a teleological sense, so his relativism is muted.  Clark essentially accepts the modern arguments of "historical science" as valid, for he never attempts to invalidate them.  Instead Clark attacks science as a whole.  While science can only "know in part," what it knows can be truthfully known.  Clark shows a lack of discernment and discretion.  He should have attacked the particular issue (historical science) instead of science generally.  People correctly defer to science for scientific questions.  However, "historical science" is not true science and people have no justification for deferring to it regarding teleological questions.  This is why Clark is in error.

Clark comes from the Presbyterians, and the Presbyterians as a whole accepted an old earth back in the nineteenth century, unlike the Baptists.  This undercut their argument for the reliability of scripture, for scripture clearly teaches that the first six days were non-figurative, but were demarcated by dark/light cycles.  The old earth hermeneutic relies upon a figurative interpretation of the first six days.  This attack on the orthodox Genesis hermeneutic is a subtle attack on the reliability of scripture.

Clark's argument against knowledge in science can also be applied to our knowledge and interpretation of scripture, for even in this life, how can we know truly since we can only know partially?  We can only know falsely, since we can only know partially, so of what value is truth to us?  Clark is hoisted on his own petard by my reductio argument.

This is a relativistic argument and shows Clark's relativistic bent in his philosophy of science.

My contention is with your use of the word "relativistic"---I don't think you're using it properly.

To do this, he borrowed heavily from postmodernism.

I think this is a great misunderstanding of postmodernism.

More proof of Clark's relativism.

That's not relativism. You're equating ignorance or uncertainty with relativism...

Clark was incorrect when he said that science was always false. He should have said, like the scripture, "for we know in part...." Science is imperfect, or incomplete, not "always false."

I don't think that 1 Cor. 13 applies to science. Regardless, if you read my comment in the same Harris post you would see that I've been a staunch critic of Clark's misguided claim that science is false. Regardless, I don't think it provides us with strong knowledge.

Descartes would not say that man can arrive at truth apart from God.

Whether Descartes thinks that man can reason apart from God is irrelevant. The fact is that his epistemology doesn't begin with God but with him: cogito ergo sum. As Bahnsen says, "Let me tell you about the foundation of knowledge: ME. Real humble guy, Descartes!"

However, there is an epistemological (philosophers would call this the weak) version of relativism that allows that while absolute truth may exist, we cannot know what it is.

That's called "skepticism," not relativism, hence I think you're the one who is confused.

an early post-modern, like Van Til.

Once again, you're operating with very strange definitions. Van Tilianism and postmodernism are diametrically opposed, otherwise Van Tilians would deny epistemological certainty.

While science can only "know in part," what it knows can be truthfully known.

How would you know? That's Clarks question (and mine).

Clark didn't accept a young earth and John Robbins (the most well-known of Clark's followers) considers this his only fault. Nevertheless, Van Til (as far as I know) and Bahnsen accepted a young earth.

Clark's argument against knowledge in science can also be applied to our knowledge and interpretation of scripture, for even in this life, how can we know truly since we can only know partially? We can only know falsely, since we can only know partially, so of what value is truth to us? Clark is hoisted on his own petard by my reductio argument.

I certainly agree with you there! Clarkians attack induction while failing to realize that language is inductive, too. Hence they fall back on the ever bizarre "divine illumination" view, which just pushes the problem back farther.

By the way, John Frame's "triperspectivalism" is absolutely devastating to scripturalism. Frame details this in The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God.

It's not obvious, but Clark borrowed heavily from Popper when he said that science is always false. Popper tried to prove that the probability of any theory being correct is always zero. Clark used this argument. Popper is considered an epistemological relativist among philosophers of science. Also, skepticism is not an epistemological school, but a response to a philosophical proposition.

I googled "we cannot know absolute truth". Postmodernism is the context for most of this discussion, although relativism is also tied in. As postmodernism is the child of relativism, it borrows heavily from relativism, especially for its epistemology. The statement I googled matches most closely with agnosticism. It ends up with the same results as relativism--the agnostic determines what is true for him. Hence, agnosticism and relativism are frequently the same thing in practice.

Let's consider the logic of agnosticism. If we cannot know absolute truth at all, we cannot know that it exists. If we cannot know that absolute truth exists, how is absolute truth relevant to us? We cannot know anything about absolute truth, hence we can rely only upon mankind for knowledge about what is.

This is where the relativist also ends up, although he may extend the separation further to allow a defense for his disharmony with some authoritarian relativist.

ben: "That's not relativism. You're equating ignorance or uncertainty with relativism"

No, Clark was saying that he cannot know absolutely that he is truly married to his wife. He can only act as if he's married because it's true for him. Clark's epistemologically uncertain answer is relativistic. Let's apply a reductio here. Clearly, if Clark can only know something truly if he knows it completely, and anything less than complete knowledge is false, Clark's belief that he was married was false and he was actually living in sin. lol

ben: "otherwise Van Tilians would deny epistemological certainty."

I retract that statement about Van Til. He used a lot of the same arguments against the modernists as the relativists did.  http://www.thirdmill.org/files/reformedperspectives/hall_of_frame/HOF.Hale.Derrida%20and%20VanTil.6.30.04.html

CVT on the age of the earth: http://www.reformed.org/creation/index.html?mainframe=/creation/van_til_on_creation.html

ben: "SD: While science can only "know in part," what it knows can be truthfully known.

How would you know? That's Clarks question (and mine)."

Well, first you have to believe that witness evidence can be reliable and that corroborative proof under careful questioning is reliable. Start with a solid epistemology which is attested by Scripture.

Clark used this argument.

Soccerdad argues that the sun exists.
Atheists argue that the sun exists.
Therefore soccerdad is an atheist.

He can only act as if he's married because it's true for him.

You'll have to provide some sort of reference for this---I've never heard anyone say it. And it certainly isn't a deduction from his scripturalism.

Well, first you have to believe that witness evidence can be reliable and that corroborative proof under careful questioning is reliable. Start with a solid epistemology which is attested by Scripture

Yeah, I mostly agree... maybe I'll explain my view some more another time.

Thanks for the comments.

ben: "Clark used this argument.

Soccerdad argues that the sun exists.
Atheists argue that the sun exists.
Therefore soccerdad is an atheist."

Actually, he used that argument in his book on philosophy of science. It's not a reductio. Prima facie, Clark actually believed it.

He can only act as if he's married because it's true for him.

ben: "You'll have to provide some sort of reference for this---I've never heard anyone say it. And it certainly isn't a deduction from his scripturalism."

I read it recently. I'll try to find it again.

ben: "Yeah, I mostly agree... maybe I'll explain my view some more another time."

I'll look forward to it.

Actually, he used that argument in his book on philosophy of science. It's not a reductio. Prima facie, Clark actually believed it.

Clark argued that you're an atheist? Wow.

I didn't want to explain my view on empirical knowledge basically because I wasn't in the mood. But basically, I think there's a difference between assuming that it is generally reliable and assuming that we can be certain of what we learn from our senses. But delineating is sticky, and I don't claim to have it all figured out. But God made the hearing ear and the seeing eye, and we wouldn't understand scripture if we didn't know something about this world, so we must be getting knowledge somehow.

ben: "Clark argued that you're an atheist? Wow."

I'm surprised you didn't ask me for a reference. 8-P    

ben: "we wouldn't understand scripture if we didn't know something about this world"

The face is the face of ben, but the voice is the voice of Frame.  

God encounters man in history and in the world (burning bush, plagues of Egypt, fire and cloud in Sinai, and, of course, in Christ). Christianity is more than propositions--although propositions are essential for knowledge. Propositions even play a part in how we react to God and his wonders, of course, but we usually don't need to be aware of them. However, when we do epistemology, being aware of them is essential.